30.6 C
Belize City
Thursday, March 28, 2024

World Down Syndrome Day

Photo: Students and staff of Stella Maris...

BPD awards 3 officers with Women Police of the Year

Photo: (l-r) Myrna Pena, Carmella Cacho, and...

Suicide on the rise!

Photo: Iveth Quintanilla, Mental Health Coordinator by Charles...

One victory for Guatemala

FeaturesOne victory for Guatemala

When British and Guatemalan businessmen put in Article Seven, the cart road in the Boundary Convention of 1859, the story is that the road would reach the Caribbean Sea through the Amatique region in Guatemala. But this piece of land was disputed by Honduras, and it was not actually won by Guatemala until the countries went to arbitration in1930, and the award was handed down in 1933.

The case was argued on vague directives from Spain, but it was also argued on effective occupation.

The fact is that Guatemala did have effective control of the area, and much of their thanks for that must go to British interests which had supported a number of business ventures (British and Belgian) in the area.

According to the arbitration story onhttp://legal.un.org, Honduras claimed the territory between the Motagua River and British Honduras, and this claim embraced “the Golfo Dulce and the so-called Amatique coast region and excludes Guatemala from the northern coast on the Atlantic Ocean.”

Honduras’s claim was based on Spanish papers, mainly a royal cedula of 1745. The arbitrators (American, Guatemalan, and Honduran) pointed out that “the territory of the Intendencia of Honduras was intended to correspond to that of the Bishopric of Honduras, but there was no precise delimitation of the extent of that bishopric.”

The arbitrators pointed out that in its first Constitution (1825), Guatemala had claimed the area, and it showed effective occupation with an 1836 decree to quarantine the area during a cholera breakout in Peten, Izabal, up to the mouth of the Motagua River.

The arbitrators said that “Constitutions of Honduras did not make specific reference to Izabal or Golfo Dulce, or to the Amatique region”, and that when Guatemala was “asserting authority over the territory”, these “assertions” by Guatemala did not arouse “immediate antagonism”, or “protest and opposition on the part of Honduras.”

A partial victory for Guatemala

In the following selections (from the paper – “American Policy in Guatemala, 1839-1900”, written in 1954 by Warren Albert Beck, B.A., M.A.) we trace a border dispute between Mexico and Guatemala, in which Mexico was victorious, but Guatemala, with the help of the US, was able to recover a piece of land it had given up. Beck argues that had Guatemala lost this piece of land, she could eventually have lost the Peten to Mexico.

In size, the Peten is about two times bigger than Belize. Guatemala has argued that Belize actually blocks her path to develop the Peten. But that is only a story. The fact is that by taking the offensive, claiming Belize, she actually put forward the best defense of this territory from the eastern side. Belize has never claimed the Peten, but the settlers were moving in that direction, working and occupying open territory in that area, when Guatemala’s leaders got wise and decided it was in their best interest to fix it in stone at Gracias a Dios and Garbutt’sFalls.

Okay, on to my final (at least for now) excerpts from Mr. Beck’s report on America in Guatemala in the 1800s.

…it was not until the independence of the United Provinces of Central America had been established that the question of the boundary with Mexico became an issue.

Soon after the revolt against Spain began, the state of Chiapas proclaimed its independence and voted to join Mexico. Though this province had been a part of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, it had been considered as a part of Mexico during the period of the Central American Federation, and the earlier Guatemalan governments made few serious claims to ownership. Guatemalans were not ready to admit the fact, but on the basis of continued possession of the state Mexico was securely in control of Chiapas. However, this possession did not preclude the officials at Guatemala City from making occasional claims to the state on the basis of historical connection. Guatemala, however, had a far better claim to Soconusco, actually a province of the state of Chiapas…
…In 1842 Santa Anna [Mexican president]…led an army into Soconusco and simply annexed the province by force. At no time could Guatemala have done anything to contest Mexico’s action, but in 1842 she was even weaker than usual. Hence, she did what she was to do throughout this boundary conflict with Mexico, first protest vigorously, and then appeal to the United States for support.

…The complicated problem of the boundaries between Guatemala and Mexico rose to paramount importance in 1881. At that time it became so completely entangled in the plan of President Barrios, of Guatemala, to effect a union of the Central American states that it is difficult to separate the two. Barrios was eager to obtain the goodwill of the United States in order to promote such a union, and he did not intend to permit what he apparently considered a minor boundary dispute to stand in his way.

The Guatemalan President planned a trip to Washington to discuss the basis upon which the United States would support his attempt to promote union. He had some “ill-defined idea of ceding Soconusco” to the United States, perhaps as payment for help in promoting union. When the showdown finally came, President Barrios conceded most of the points in question to Mexico, so that the boundary dispute would not hamper his attempt to recreate the old Central-American Federation.

…Part of the [Mexican] resentment against the United States stemmed from the Mexican fear of a promotion of Central American union under the auspices of Washington. Such a federation could become strong enough to attack Mexico…

…By way of even further admission that the claim to Chiapas and Soconusco was not too well founded, an offer was made by Guatemala to renounce all claim to the disputed area if Mexico would pay an indemnity of $4,000,000. This the stronger nation in the dispute was not willing to do.

…Failure to insist upon arbitration in case the boundary could not be determined was Barrios’ first mistake, one which was to enable Mexico to demand more territory than it had originally claimed.

…The dispute continued because the boundary line agreed upon at the conference table was difficult to establish in the field. And as the years passed without a settlement, Guatemalan interests were to suffer, since actual possession had been agreed upon as one of the bases for determining title to dubious regions, and Mexico displayed consistent militancy by sending troops into disputed areas which she then claimed on the grounds of actual possession. Hence, there were numerous appeals by Guatemala to Washington for protection against the rapacity of her neighbor.

…Most of the boundary was agreed upon soon after the treaty of 1882. As usual in such boundary disputes, the stumbling-block was provided because of the inability to identify the river referred to in the treaty. It had been stipulated that the boundary should follow an astronomical line to the Rio Usumacinta and thence proceed along this river to another astronomical line. The problem arose out of the fact that the above-named river was formed mainly by two tributaries at the designated point. Guatemala insisted that the tributary referred to was the Rio Chixoy (Salinas), whereas Mexico contended that it was the Rio de la Pasion.

Between these two rivers the area in dispute was a rectangle of approximately 6,000 to 7,000 square miles. Of vital importance to Guatemala was the fact that forfeiture of the disputed area would mean that effective contact with the district of Peten would be lost. Only a narrow corridor would have remained, and Mexico could have expected soon to claim the entire region.

…on May 8, 1899 treaty ratifications were completed, with Guatemala retaining the area she claimed…

…The significance of the long drawn-out boundary conflict between Guatemala and Mexico does not lie in the fact that the latter nation made good its claim to Chiapas and Soconusco, nor in the fact that Guatemala was able to retain a few thousand square miles of mosquito-infested lowlands.

Rather, this boundary conflict is an important chapter in the story of American policy in Guatemala because it well illustrates the great dependence that Guatemala placed upon the United States as its protector against the aggressive designs of a more powerful neighbor.

Compensation for what?

Space precludes, so just this point. At the end of the day it is all about a cart road, and this story will end in defeat for Guatemala. The logic line says that Article Seven of the 1859 Boundary Convention was a little business deal hashed up and snuck in by business people in British Honduras and Guatemala. The evidence of that is that this cart road had no costings, no parameters, just that it would go to the coast, thru the Izabal District in Guatemala.

Check out our other content

World Down Syndrome Day

Suicide on the rise!

Check out other tags:

International