Contributed by Hortence Wade (retired educator)
Question: Is it defensible to treat religion in schools in the same way as, say, geography or mathematics?
BELIZE CITY, Mon. May 5, 2025
There are two aspects to the teaching of religion in school: 1) It is an education in itself; and 2) It is a kind of preparation for the individual for the fullness or wholeness of the Christian (or Muslim, or Hindu, or Baha’i, etc.) experience.
The meaning and importance which any person attaches to religion depends on the place he accords it as an interest and activity in life. In so far as general education sets complete living as its major objective, and includes religious interests and values in its definition of complete living, it has opened the way for making a place in its scheme of things for education in religion. Any education dealing with life is potentially religious.
To many, religion is an essential and inalienable ingredient of human experience. It is the response of the individual to that which he holds to be of supreme worth, and leads to harmonious adjustments to his environment. It also has instrumental value in the promotion of other interests, particularly morality. However, for others it provides meaning to events that man does not expect or feels ought not to happen, events that are frustrating or contradictory, such as death or unsatisfied needs.
It had been claimed that the teaching of Religion must be kept apart from the teaching of other subjects on the grounds that its methods are incompatible with those that are employed in the regular work of the school.
In attempting to answer this question, a fundamental prerequisite is that of understanding the role of the teacher of Religion. In some schools today, and particularly those that are denominational, religion teachers seem to perceive their role in terms of commitment. Processes employed in this case are those of getting the learner to be committed to or fostering certain religious values and beliefs. The difference between teaching for this kind of commitment and teaching so that the learner “learns about” religion, is also very important to appreciate in dealing with the question.
Two demands are usually made of teachers of Religion: 1) that they must believe what they teach, and 2) that they must practice what they believe. Since it is very difficult to perceive the meaning of this, one way out of this dilemma is for the teacher to keep with the idea of education instead of handing out judgements of right and wrong. The ideas or principles of education are the religious teacher’s first order of activity. These principles indicate that school subjects, including Religion, should be treated in a manner which “assists the development of ‘cognitive perspective’ or rationality, promotes understanding of the structure and procedures of the disciplines, recognizes the integrity, autonomy and voluntariness” of the pupil. The teacher then must look at the kind of contribution which a study of Religion can make to achieving educational goals. This entails regarding Religion as a study or discipline or a form of knowledge. This is different from regarding it as a system of beliefs to which it is necessary to commit a learner.
If the teacher can identify Religion as a form of knowledge with educational goals, then in all probability he will see this as consisting of an overall understanding of the concepts and truths or methodology of the discipline called Religion. He will further see it as getting the children or learners to be able to describe the social and personal implications of belonging to a religion. If the teaching of Religion is regarded in this perspective, the teacher will equate it with an academic discipline, and as such will treat it in this manner in the classroom. In this case, the teacher disassociates himself from the teaching of Religion for the purpose of gaining insight into religious beliefs for commitment.
Religion seen as Christianity is historical. Looking at it objectively involves considering events in time, and there is a great deal that is factual, external and explicit that has to be learned. If one looks at the teaching of Religion from this point of view, it is reasonable to defend treating it as an academic discipline. This is treating Religion with an objective approach, as is done with those disciplines which dice with facts and laws and have objective values.
It is even more so when one thinks in terms of subjects such as History, Literature and to some extent, Geography, since it also means looking at the life of man in all its aspects, that is, in relation to the natural world, the past, the present and the future.
In teaching Religion for the purpose of commitment to a particular religion, teacher and learner become subjective. This pattern embraces religious upbringing and initiation. There are views that assert that Religion must involve the promulgation or participation in one particular religion. One writer tried to verify the truth in this by saying that “the attempt to speak without speaking any particular language is not more helpless than to have Religion that is no Religion in particular.” It is true that one cannot come to terms with the ultimate and synoptic concerns which make up the focus of Religion, except by some reasonable framework of understanding.
However, it has already been implied that Religion is a form of philosophical and sociological education, and therefore the above statement cannot totally be justified.
This looks at Religion from the point of view of doctrine, and so, such can hardly be treated as a regular school subject. The position given to doctrine in religious education depends to a large extent upon one’s conception of truth. Is truth something propositional, a matter of words and ideas, or is it something organic and expressed in persons rather than words? In a child’s early years, much dogma is absorbed that has the tendency to create in the minds of some people an almost superstitious attachment to doctrine, so that if afterwards it is challenged, they feel fear and anger. In the opinion of this writer, familiarizing an individual with doctrine has nothing to do with Religion, since it is possible to be a loyal Catholic or Protestant or whatever, without being a religious person at all.
Chambers states that he has discovered that in some statements about doctrine there is no general agreement of the requirements of evidence. However, when there is a demand for evidence, the claims or doctrinal statements are changed to some degree. Believers see the world in terms of what they believe, and because of these beliefs, they see what they take to be confirming instances. This is a human trait, he says, that reveals an irrational basis.
It is psychologically necessary for many people to accept doctrinal beliefs, since it helps to put their own world into perspective. They overlook the controversy of the issue, and many times try to force others to accept their own beliefs. If teachers teach Religion in relation to these beliefs, methods are called for, to ensure that what is being taught is not indoctrination—-indoctrination defined as the intentional implanting of belief so that it will stick by nonrational means. The basic propositions of religion are unprovable, and there are no rational means of establishing their truth. Any success in evoking permanent commitment to them must rely on nonrational means.
When schools demand that children participate in religious services and assemblies, although the intention is not to indoctrinate, the use of non-rational means of persuasion contributes to indoctrination, since schools take it for granted that the subject matter is straightforward and factual. In the complete absence of agreement as to what would count as relevant evidence, the reason is clearer why religious utterances and beliefs have to be classified as prime examples of unprovable propositions. The teaching of Religion presupposes a definite body of truths and statements that are often vague and actually presentations of doctrine that have a wide margin of views which may or may not be in accord with truth.
It is reasonable to assume, then, that if the educator is teaching for the purpose of commitment to a specific religious doctrine which is truth, and in fact what takes place in some schools, then treating Religion as one would a school subject cannot be defended. Furthermore, the subjectivity of this approach to Religion does not allow for it to be treated as an academic discipline, for the reason that the natural sciences deal with facts and laws that have objective values.
This conclusion was drawn from a position of looking at the views or perspectives taken by the religious educator. If the teaching of Religion is perceived objectively, as a whole in terms of its social and philosophical aspects and implications, then it is defensible to treat it as an academic discipline. This is also based on the fact that the academic disciplines embrace objective values in dealing with facts and laws. If, however, the teaching is done for the purpose of commitment to a particular religious doctrine, then it is not defensible to treat Religion as an academic discipline. It becomes subjective and, unlike the academic disciplines, this approach relies heavily on the transmitting of religious beliefs which are basically unprovable.
References: John Chambers – The Achievement of Education, Harper and Roe 1983; Barrow, Robin – The Philosophy of School, Halsted Press 1981; Haralambos, M. – When is Commitment a problem in Religious Education; British Journal of Educational studies Vol XXIX, NI Feb. 1981; Kleinig, John – Philosophical Issues in Education, St. Martin’s Press, New York 1982.